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Two experiments examined the role of memory for behavioral episodes in judgments
about in-groups and out-groups. Using a minimal group paradigm, participants read either
positive or negative trait-relevant behaviors performed by group members. They then were
asked to make judgments about the group’s trait characteristics. Results demonstrated that,
for groups described positively, judgments about the out-group but not the in-group were
accomplished by retrieving from memory speciﬁc behaviors performed by group mem-
bers. In contrast, for groups described negatively, judgments about the in-group but not the
out-group were accomplished by retrieving speciﬁc behaviors performed by group mem-
bers. These results suggest that basic differences in the way judgments about in-groups and
out-groups are made contribute to the establishment and perpetuation of intergroup bias by
decreasing the stability of negative in-group and positive out-group impressions and
increasing the stability of positive in-group and negative out-group impressions. r 1998
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No. of Pages—15 First page no.—51 Last page no.—65Beliefs in the superiority of in-groups over out-groups are remarkably persis-
tent, even in the face of disconﬁrming evidence. Contributing to this persistence is
the expectation that in-groups will engage in more positive and fewer negative
behaviors than out-groups (e.g., Howard & Rothbart, 1980; Maass, Milesi,
Zabbini, & Stahlberg, 1995). This expectation has signiﬁcant implications for
intergroup perception. First, expected behaviors are perceived to have more
diagnostic value for inferring underlying dispositions than unexpected behaviors
(Trope, 1986). Second, perceivers require less evidence to accept an expected
versus an unexpected conclusion (Trope & Liberman, 1996). Consistent with
these biases, expected behaviors are more likely to yield dispositional inferences
than unexpected behaviors (e.g., Bodenhausen & Wyer, 1985; Hastie, 1984;
Maass et al., 1995). This research suggests that perceivers may place greater trust
in evidence suggesting in-group superiority than inferiority, and may draw
corresponding inferences more readily.
In fact, there is strong evidence for such intergroup biases in social perception.
First, whereas positive in-group and negative out-group behaviors tend to be
described in relatively broad language that implies dispositional stability, nega-
tive in-group and positive out-group behaviors tend to be described in rather
narrowtermsimplyingsituationalinconsistency(e.g.,Hamilton,Gibbons,Stroess-
ner, & Sherman, 1992; Maass & Arcuri, 1992; Maass, Salvi, Arcuri, & Semin,
1989). Second, whereas perceivers tend to attribute positive in-group and nega-
tive out-group behaviors to stable personality factors, they are more likely to
attribute negative in-group and positive out-group behaviors to unstable situ-
ational factors (e.g., Hewstone & Jaspers, 1984; Pettigrew, 1979).These linguistic
and attributional biases contribute to the persistence of positive in-group and
negative out-group impressions and decrease the stability of negative in-group
and positive out-group impressions.
Such expectancy-based biases may further be enhanced in intergroup contexts
by motivational concerns having to do with social identity (e.g., Tajfel & Turner,
1979). Because perceivers both expect and desire the in-group to be more
favorable than the out-group, they may set a particularly high threshold for
accepting evidence to the contrary (see Trope & Liberman, 1996 for a review of
expectancy- and motivation-based biases in hypothesis testing). This would
further increase the tendency to draw dispositional inferences from positive
in-group and negative out-group, but not negative in-group and positive out-
group behaviors.
Intergroup Bias in the Judgment Process
These encoding biases have implications for other important aspects of inter-
group perception. In this research, we examine differences in the kinds of
information perceivers access to make judgments about in-groups and out-groups.
In particular, we are interested in the extent to which in-group and out-group
judgments are based on biographical memories about speciﬁc group members.
One factor that determines the extent of such exemplar-based social judgments is
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the initial stages of learning about a target, prior to the formation of stable
impressions, judgments are often based on memory for speciﬁc episodes. How-
ever, once perceivers have developed and stored dispositional trait inferences,
they are less likely to base social judgments on the activation of speciﬁc episodes
(e.g., Hastie & Park, 1986; Klein, Loftus, Trafton, & Fuhrman, 1992; Sherman &
Klein, 1994; Sherman, 1996). Instead, it appears that judgments rely on trait-
based behavioral summaries that have either been formed on-line during encoding
and stored (e.g., Hastie & Park, 1986; Klein et al., 1992; Sherman & Klein, 1994)
or have been inferred from group membership (Sherman, 1996). This pattern has
been shown to generalize across many different social judgment domains,
including self-judgments (e.g., Klein & Loftus, 1993a; Klein et al., 1992),
judgments about individual targets (e.g., Anderson & Hubert, 1963; Bargh &
Thein, 1985; Fiske & Dyer, 1985; Hastie & Park, 1986; Klein et al., 1992; Park,
1986; Sherman & Klein, 1994), and, of greatest relevance, judgments about social
groups (e.g., Sherman, 1996).
In the case of judgments about in-groups and out-groups, this research suggests
that judgments about negative aspects of in-groups and positive aspects of
out-groups will be based on particular group exemplars. Because dispositional
inferences are less likely to be derived from negative in-group and positive
out-group behaviors, relevant judgments may be expected to rely on the activation
of behavioral information about particular group members. In contrast, because
trait inferences are more likely to be formed based on positive in-group and
negative out-group behaviors, judgments along these dimensions should be less
likely to involve the activation of information about particular group exemplars.
These predictions may be seen as analogous to those of the linguistic intergroup
bias (e.g., Hamilton et al., 1992; Maass &Arcuri, 1992; Maass et al., 1995; Maass
et al., 1989). However, whereas the linguistic intergroup bias is concerned with
perceivers’ outward descriptions of particular acts, the proposed judgment bias
focuses on the extent to which particular acts are spontaneously considered during
the group judgment process.
These hypothesized differences in the extent to which in-group and out-group
judgments are exemplar-based may have important implications for intergroup
perception. Judgments that are based on the activation of speciﬁc behavioral
memories have important properties that differ from those based on more abstract
kindsofknowledge(e.g.,trait-basedimpressions).Inparticular,becauseinstance-
based judgments typically rely on the most currently accessible behaviors in
memory (which is often dependent on how recently the behaviors have been
encountered), they are particularly ﬂexible, changeable, and responsive to new
evidence (Smith, 1990). As new behaviors are observed, instance-based judg-
ments change accordingly. In contrast, more abstract kinds of knowledge evolve
slowly as information accumulates. Newly encountered behaviors have little
impact on trait-based impressions that summarize all relevant behavioral episodes
known about the target (Smith, 1990). Thus, the application of particular behav-
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of out-groups would reduce the consistency and stability of these impressions.
These impressions would remain relatively open to revision should new behav-
ioral evidence come to light. In contrast, because they do not involve the
activation of speciﬁc group exemplars, judgments about positively described
in-groups and negatively described out-groups would be less open to revision in
the face of new behavioral evidence. Thus, differences in the kinds of information
activated during judgments about in-groups and out-groups may contribute to the
persistence of beliefs in in-group superiority.
Testing the Role of Behavioral Memories in Judgments About In-Groups
and Out-Groups
To assess directly the role of behavioral memories in judgments about in-
groups and out-groups, it is important to control both the amount and type of
information that a person knows about these groups. As described above,
differences in experience levels with groups has been shown to inﬂuence the
nature of group judgment processes (Sherman, 1996). We controlled for group
familiarity in the present research by using a minimal group paradigm in which
in-group and out-group categorization was assigned on the basis of an arbitrary
procedure (e.g., Tajfel, 1970). After estimating the number of dots on sheets of
paper, participants were arbitrarily classiﬁed either as dot underestimators or dot
overestimators. Participants were then provided with behaviors performed either
by members of their in-group or out-group and were asked to form an impression
of the corresponding group.
To examine the role of memories for speciﬁc behaviors in group judgments, we
used a priming procedure that Klein and Loftus and their colleagues developed to
assess the role of behaviors in judgments about the self and others (e.g., Klein &
Loftus, 1990, 1993a, 1993b, 1993c; Klein, Loftus, & Burton, 1989; Klein et al.,
1992; Schell, Klein, & Loftus, 1996; Sherman, 1996; Sherman & Klein, 1994).
The procedure is based on the following reasoning: Suppose participants perform
two tasks in succession. If, in the process of performing the ﬁrst task, information
relevant to the second task is made available, then the time required to perform the
second task should be less than if that information had not been made available.
Therefore, one way to assess the extent to which two tasks make available the
same information is to examine the degree to which performing the ﬁrst leads to a
decreased latency in performing the second. The reduction in performance time
should be greatest when the information overlap between the ﬁrst and second task
is relatively large, and should be least when the overlap is relatively small.
In the current experiments the procedure consisted of three types of tasks: a
deﬁne task, which required participants to think of the deﬁnition of a trait (e.g.,
‘‘think of the meaning of the word intelligent’’) a describe task, which required
participants to decide whether the trait was consistent with their impression of the
target group (e.g., ‘‘does the word intelligent describe overestimators’’); and a
recall task, which required participants to remember a speciﬁc instance in which a
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incident in which an overestimator behaved in an intelligent manner’’). Each trial
consisted of performing two of these tasks—an initial task and a target task—in
succession on the same trait word. In these experiments, the target task was
always a recall task. For some participants, this task was preceded by an initial
describe task, and for other participants, the initial task was a deﬁne task.
If judgments about a group’s traits are based on the retrieval of trait-relevant
behavioral memories, then a describe task should be more facilitating than a
deﬁne task to the performance of a subsequent recall task (Klein, Babey, &
Sherman, 1997; Klein & Loftus, 1993a; see also Klein et al., 1989; Klein et al.,
1992; Sherman, 1996). This is because performing the describe task requires
activating memories of behavioral episodes, whereas generating a deﬁnition does
not (see Klein et al., 1997; Klein & Loftus, 1993a; Klein et al., 1992; Sherman &
Klein, 1994, for evidence in support of these assumptions).Adescribe task should
therefore be more beneﬁcial to the performance of a subsequent recall task,
because retrieving a behavior should be faster if behaviors recently have been
activated. On the other hand, if judgments about a group’s traits do not rely on the
activation of speciﬁc behaviors, then performing a describe task should not lead to
a greater reduction in the time required to perform a subsequent recall task than
would result from ﬁrst performing a deﬁne task. This is because behaviors would
not have been activated to perform the initial describe task.
EXPERIMENT 1
In Experiment 1, we presented participants with positively described in-groups
or out-groups. We predicted that judgments about the out-groups would be based
on the retrieval of speciﬁc behaviors performed by individual group members.
Accordingly, the time required to recall a speciﬁc behavior should be shorter
following an initial describe task than an initial deﬁne task when these types of
judgments are made. In contrast, judgments about positively described in-groups
should be made without reference to speciﬁc group behaviors.Therefore, the time
required to recall a speciﬁc behavior should be equally fast following initial
describe and deﬁne tasks.
Method
Participants. Participants were 80 undergraduates from the University of California, Santa Barbara
subject pool who participated for partial course credit. Participants were tested in groups of 1 to 4 in
sessions lasting approximately 40 min.
Materials and design. Three sheets of paper, each of which contained a different random dot
conﬁguration, were created. Participants were asked to estimate the number of dots appearing on each
sheet. After making their estimates, participants were randomly assigned either to the group ‘‘dot
overestimators’’ or the group ‘‘dot underestimators,’’ using a procedure similar to that developed by
Gerard and Hoyt (1974; see also Howard & Rothbart, 1980). This assignment served as the basis for
in-group/out-group categorization.
All participants saw the same list of 7 intelligent and 7 friendly behaviors. On scales that ranged
from 0 (not at all intelligent, friendly) to 9 (very intelligent, friendly), pilot testing conﬁrmed that the
intelligent behaviors were seen as intelligent (M 5 6.92) and the friendly behaviors were seen as
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different members of their in-group, and half were told the behaviors were performed by 14 different
members of the out-group.
On the test trial, participants were asked to perform either an initial describe or deﬁne task. For the
describe task, participants decided whether the stimulus trait provided a general description of the
group of people they had learned about; for the deﬁne task, participants thought of a deﬁnition for the
presented stimulus trait. Following the initial task, all participants performed a recall target task, which
required them to retrieve from memory a speciﬁc instance in which a group member’s behavior
exempliﬁed the stimulus trait. The initial and target task were performed in reference either to the trait
intelligent or to the trait friendly.1 In summary, the experiment was a 2 (in-group vs out-group) 3 2
(friendly vs intelligent) 3 2 (initial task: deﬁne vs describe) between-subjects design.
Procedure. At the start of the experiment, participants were introduced to the dot estimation
procedure with instructions similar to those used by Howard and Rothbart (1980): ‘‘Today you will be
participating in several different studies examining how people make judgments. The ﬁrst study is
concerned with how people make estimates of the number of objects they have seen.’’
Participants then were presented with three sheets of paper, each containing a different random
conﬁguration of dots. For each sheet, they were asked to estimate the number of dots appearing on the
page, and to enter their estimates into the computer. Twenty seconds after participants entered their
third estimate, the computer informed them either that they were an ‘‘OVERESTIMATOR’’ or an
‘‘UNDERESTIMATOR.’’
Upon completion of the dot estimation task, the instructions informed participants that ‘‘Past
research indicates that, given the task of estimating how many objects they have seen, some people
tend to consistently overestimate the correct number and some people tend to consistently underesti-
mate the correct number. While psychologists do not place any value judgment on whether it is better
to be an overestimator or an underestimator, research has suggested that whether one is an
overestimator or an underestimator tends to reveal something fundamental about the psychological
characteristics and personality of a person.’’
Participants were next told that they would see a list of behaviors that had been obtained from a
previous study examining the behavior of overestimators and underestimators. Half the participants
were told the behaviors were performed by members of their in-group, while half were told the
behaviors were performed by the out-group. Participants were instructed to form an impression about
the target group (in-group or out-group) based on the behaviors presented. The behaviors were
presented on a microcomputer at the rate of one every 6 s.
After reading the behaviors, participants were trained to perform the deﬁne, describe, and recall
tasks. For these practice trials, participants were instructed to think of a close friend, and to use that
person as the target for the describe and recall tasks. Each trial consisted of performing two tasks in
succession: an initial task and a target task on a trait unrelated to intelligence or friendliness. For the
deﬁne task, participants thought of the deﬁnition of the trait; for the describe task, participants
determined whether the trait described their friend; and for the recall task, participants remembered an
instance in which their friend acted in a manner consistent with the trait. Participants performed all six
different combinations of initial task and target task so that they would not expect any particular
sequence during the test trial.
Once the practice trials were completed, participants were given a single test trial in which they
were asked to refer back to the target group they had learned about during the impression formation
part of the experiment. A trial began with the appearance on the computer screen of one of the
following cues for the initial task: DEFINE (deﬁne task) or DESCRIBES OVERESTIMATOR
(UNDERESTIMATOR) (describe task). A stimulus trait appeared beneath the cue 2 s later. The cue
and stimulus trait remained on the screen until the participant indicated by pressing the space bar that
1 We did not request that participants report their responses during the experimental trials; rather, we
instructed them to generate responses to the task questions in their heads. Klein and Loftus (1993a,
1993c) provide a detailed discussion of our reasons for adopting this procedure and present research
demonstrating the efficacy of the technique.
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GROUP—appeared on the screen above the same stimulus trait, and a timer started in the computer.
This cue and the stimulus trait remained on the screen until the participant signaled, by pressing the
space bar, that he or she had completed the target task. For half of the participants, the trait used in the
test trial was intelligent, and for the other half, the trait was friendly.2
Immediately after the test trial participants were asked to write the speciﬁc intelligent or friendly
behavior they recalled when performing the recall task. Participants who failed to report accurately a
stimulus behavior were removed from the data set.
Results
We set a cutoff point to exclude from the data set participants whose response
latencies were longer than 10 s. This resulted in the removal of 2 participants.
Additionally, 11 participants who failed to write down a speciﬁc behavior after
completing the recall target task were removed from the data set. The analyses
were based on the data of the remaining 67 participants.3
We performed a 2 (in-group vs out-group) 3 2 (friendly vs intelligent) 3 2
(initial task: deﬁne vs describe) between-subjects analysis of variance (ANOVA)
on the recall target task response latencies. The analysis yielded a signiﬁcant
interaction between initial task and target group, F(1, 59) 5 7.33, p , .01 (see
Fig. 1).Aplanned comparison indicated that for out-group members, participants
took signiﬁcantly less time to recall a positive behavior following an initial
describe task (M 5 3846 ms) than following an initial deﬁne task (M 5 5538 ms),
F(1, 33) 5 7.18, p , .05. For the in-group, by contrast, the time required to recall
a positive behavior did not differ reliably as a function of initial task (describe task
M 5 5207; deﬁne task M 5 4510 ms), F(1, 30) 5 1.12, p . .20.The same pattern
of data was present for both the friendly and intelligent trait judgments, and no
other main effects or interactions approached signiﬁcance.4
2 To test whether our manipulation of participants into in-groups and out-groups was successful, a
group of University of California, Santa Barbara undergraduates (N 5 32) were run through the
procedure just described with one exception: Immediately after reading the list of behaviors about
either the in-group or the out-group, participants were asked to rate the similarity of the target group
members using a 9-point scale ranging from extremely dissimilar (1) to extremely similar (9). The
experiment concluded once participants made their rating of group variability. We reasoned that if our
minimal group manipulation was effective, an OHE should be evident in participants’group variability
ratings—participants should rate the out-group as more homogeneous than the in-group (Anumber of
investigators have obtained OHE’s using a minimal group paradigm (e.g., Mackie, Sherman, &Worth,
1993; Judd & Park, 1988; Mullen & Hu, 1989), although not all have been successful (e.g., Ostrom &
Sedikides, 1992)). Consistent with these predictions, analysis of participants’ ratings revealed that
members of the out-group were perceived as more similar to one another than were members of the
in-group, (Ms 5 7.06 and 6.00, for the out-group and in-group, respectively, t(30) 5 2.18, p , .05).
3 Of the 11 participants who failed to recall a behavior, 4 wrote nothing and 7 wrote the name of the
trait for which information was being requested (e.g., friendly). These participants may have
misunderstood the instruction to report a particular behavior they had read.
4 In interpreting these results, it is important to remember that the recall tasks following the deﬁne
conditions provide baseline estimates of how long it takes to retrieve in-group and out-group
behaviors. From these baseline data, it would appear that it takes less time to recall a positive in-group
than a positive out-group behavior. However, in order to determine the extent to which speciﬁc
behaviors are spontaneously activated during in-group and out-group judgments, it is necessary to
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These results are consistent with the predicted intergroup bias in the group
judgment process. When the out-group was the target, recall latencies were faster
following an initial describe task than an initial deﬁne task.This demonstrates that
judgments about the out-group were made by accessing from memory behaviors
performed by group members. By contrast, when the target was an in-group, there
was no reliable difference in recall latencies following a describe or deﬁne task.
This suggests that these judgments were based on more abstract kinds of
knowledge (e.g., stored trait summaries), and not on speciﬁc behaviors.
EXPERIMENT 2
Experiment 1 provided partial support for our hypotheses by demonstrating
that, when participants were presented with positive descriptions of a group,
judgments were based on the retrieval of speciﬁc behaviors only when the group
was an out-group. We also hypothesized in-group/out-group differences in the
judgment process when the groups are described in negative terms. In particular,
we predict that judgments of a negatively described in-group, but not a negatively
described out-group, will rely on the retrieval of speciﬁc behaviors. Experiment 2
tested this hypothesis. The experiment was identical to Experiment 1 with the
examine what effect an initial describe judgment task has on this baseline retrieval time. If behaviors
are being activated during the judgment task, then retrieval times should be facilitated following a
describe task as compared to the baseline condition. This is exactly what happened for judgments of
the out-group, but not the in-group. The same logic applies when interpreting the results from
Experiment 2.
FIG. 1. Mean recall target task response latencies (in milliseconds) as a function of initial task
(deﬁne or describe) and target group (in-group or out-group): Experiment 1.
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instead of positive.
Method
Participants. Participants were 88 undergraduates from the University of California, Santa Barbara
subject pool. Participants were tested in groups of 1 to 4 in sessions lasting approximately 40 min.
Materials, design, and procedure. The materials, design, and procedure were the same as in
Experiment 1, except that the stimulus list consisted of 7 unintelligent and 7 unfriendly behaviors, and
the deﬁne, describe, and recall tasks required subjects to consider these traits in their responses. On
scales that ranged from 0 (not at all intelligent, friendly) to 9 (very intelligent, friendly), pilot testing
conﬁrmed that the unintelligent behaviors were seen as unintelligent (M 5 2.67) and the unfriendly
behaviors were seen as unfriendly (M 5 2.50).
Results and Discussion
Participants whose response latencies were longer than 10 s were removed
from the data set. This resulted in the removal of 4 participants. Additionally, 7
participants who failed to write down a speciﬁc behavior after completing the
recall task were removed from the data set.The analyses were based on the data of
the remaining 77 participants.5
We predicted that, when experiences with the in-group and out-group are
negative, only in-group judgments will be based on the retrieval of speciﬁc
behaviors performed by group members. Therefore, for in-group members, recall
task times should be shorter following an initial describe task than an initial deﬁne
task. By contrast, for out-group members, recall task times should be equal
following initial describe and deﬁne tasks.
We performed a 2 (in-group vs out-group)32 (unfriendly vs unintelligent)32
(initial task: deﬁne vs describe) between-subjects analysis of variance (ANOVA)
on the recall target task response latencies. This analysis yielded a marginally
reliable interaction between initial task and target group, F(1, 69) 5 3.25, p , .08
(see Fig. 2). Planned comparisons revealed that, as predicted, in-group partici-
pants were faster to recall a behavior following an initial describe task (M 5 4831
ms) than following an initial deﬁne task (M 5 6146 ms), F(1, 41) 5 4.16, p ,
.05. By contrast, for the out-group, the time required to recall a behavior was not
differentially facilitated by the previous performance of a describe (M 5 5347
ms) or deﬁne task (M 5 4760 ms), F(1, 32) 5 .64, p . .40. The same pattern of
data was present for both the unfriendly and unintelligent trait judgments, and no
other main effects or interactions approached signiﬁcance.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The goal of this research was to examine the role of behavioral memories in
judgments about in-groups and out-groups. We found evidence for an intergroup
bias in the processes by which people make these judgments. Whereas judgments
about negatively described in-groups and positively described out-groups in-
5 All 7 participants who failed to recall a behavior wrote the name of the trait for which information
was being requested.
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described in-groups and negatively described out-groups did not. Rather, in the
absence of behavioral activation, it would seem that these latter judgments would
necessarily have relied on more abstract kinds of knowledge (e.g., stored trait
inferences; see Hastie & Park, 1986; Klein & Loftus, 1993a; Klein et al., 1992;
Klein, Sherman, & Loftus, 1996; Sherman, 1996; Sherman & Klein, 1994).These
processing differences may play a vital role in the perpetuation of intergroup
biases by allowing for high ﬂexibility in negative impressions of in-groups and
positive impressions of out-groups. Because these kinds of impressions are
behavior-based, they may be changed relatively easily if new evidence is
received. In contrast, positive impressions of in-groups and negative impressions
of out-groups appear to be less subject to alteration.
Bases of the Intergroup Processing Bias
Our explanation for the intergroup processing bias has emphasized the expec-
tancy and motivation-based encoding biases that occur as perceivers learn about
in-groups and out-groups. People perceive positive in-group and negative out-
group behaviors as more diagnostic of underlying dispositions (Maass & Arcuri,
1992; Maass et al., 1989; Trope, 1986) and require less evidence of such
behaviors to make corresponding trait inferences (Hewstone & Jaspers, 1984;
Pettigrew, 1979; Trope & Liberman, 1996). As a result, when making judgments
about relevant group attributes, perceivers will be more likely to have stored trait
summaries at their disposal, and will be less likely to rely on biographical
memories for speciﬁc group behaviors.
FIG. 2. Mean recall target task response latencies (in milliseconds) as a function of initial task
(deﬁne or describe) and target group (in-group or out-group): Experiment 2.
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intergroup encoding biases or differential possession of and/or use of trait-based
dispositional impressions in our experiments. Certainly, the data suggest that
perceivers possessed and relied on such abstract knowledge when making
judgments about positive in-groups and negative out-groups. However, we cannot
conclude that participants did not also have and use such abstract knowledge
when making judgments about negative in-groups and positive out-groups. That
is, the activation of biographical memories in these conditions may have occurred
in addition to, and not instead of, the use of abstract trait knowledge.
Also, the possibility remains that our results were not based solely on biased
encoding processes. The kinds of expectancy- and motivation-based biases we
have described may also arise during the judgment task itself. In particular, if a
judgment that an in-group is negative or that an out-group is positive violates an
expectancy of in-group superiority, then perceivers may set a particularly high
threshold for accepting such a conclusion (e.g., Trope & Liberman, 1996). As a
result, participants may have felt the need to ‘‘double check’’such judgments by
referring back to the original behavioral data. In contrast, judgments that in-
groups are positive or that out-groups are negative may not have required an
investigation into the behavioral evidence. Note that this explanation does not
require the assumption of intergroup differences in the extent to which disposi-
tional inferences have been formed and stored. Instead, the effects could be due to
differences in the extent to which perceivers feel the need to supplement their trait
impressions with behavioral memories.
As in the case of encoding processes, social identity concerns may further bias
such retrieval effects (Trope & Liberman, 1996). If perceivers are motivated
against making negative judgments about in-groups and positive judgments about
out-groups, then they may carefully scrutinize the original behavioral data for
disconﬁrming evidence when they make their judgments. In contrast, perceivers
may not be concerned about making relatively unexamined positive in-group and
negative out-group judgments.As a result, these judgments would not involve the
activation of behavioral memories.
Despite these possibilities, we believe that our data are best explained by
representational differences arising from biased encoding processes. There is an
extensive body of work demonstrating that exemplar-based judgments are more
likely to occur when dispositional, trait-based impressions are weak or unformed,
and that, as impressions become more stable and dispositional in nature, exemplar
use decreases (e.g., Anderson & Hubert, 1963; Bargh & Thein, 1985; Fiske &
Dyer, 1985; Hastie & Park, 1986; Klein & Loftus, 1993a; Klein et al., 1992; Park,
1986; Sherman, 1996; Sherman & Klein, 1994). In light of this research, the
presence of exemplar-based processes in judgments about negative in-groups and
positive out-groups but not positive in-groups and negative out-groups strongly
suggests that impressions of the latter groups were more abstract and trait-based
than impressions of the former groups.
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The results of these experiments may help to explain ﬁndings of intergroup bias
in minimal group settings (for a review, see Messick & Mackie, 1989). Social
identity theory (e.g., Tajfel & Turner, 1979) suggests that such effects are due to
participants’ motivation to enhance self-esteem by elevating the in-group and
derogating the out-group. However, it is unclear exactly how people accomplish
these goals. Our research suggests that intergroup bias may be much more subtle
and complex than a perceiver’s simple conscious desire to say and do good things
for in-groups and bad things for out-groups. Instead, it appears that there are basic
differences in the cognitive processes involved in in-group and out-group judg-
ments, even when perceivers are equally (un)familiar with the groups. In our
experiments, participants were presented with the same information about in-
groups and out-groups and did not know any members of the groups. Neverthe-
less, participants demonstrated a reliance on behavioral memories for judgments
about negative in-groups and positive out-groups, but not for judgments about
positive in-groups and negative out-groups. These results show that, even when
in-groups and out-groups are described identically, the judgment process pro-
duces disparities in group evaluations. By increasing the breadth of positive
in-group and negative out-group impressions, and by decreasing the breadth of
negative in-group and positive out-group impressions, these processing differ-
ences may have contributed to previous demonstrations of bias in the minimal
group paradigm on such dependent measures as personality assessment, perfor-
mance evaluation, and resource distribution (e.g., Messick & Mackie, 1989).
Implications for Models of the Out-Group Homogeneity Effect
Research on the out-group homogeneity effect (OHE) has been concerned with
the role of behavioral memories in intergroup judgments for some time (for recent
reviews, see Hamilton & Sherman, 1994; Mackie et al., 1993; Park, Judd, &
Ryan, 1991). Many researchers have argued that perceptions of variability are
directly tied to the extent to which group behaviors are activated during the
judgment process (e.g., Judd & Park, 1988; Linville, Fischer, & Salovey, 1989;
Park et al., 1991; Smith & Zarate, 1992). The more different group behaviors
retrieved, the more diverse the informational base for the judgment, and the
greater the perceived variability. For a variety of reasons, in-group judgments of
variability are thought to be more dependent on group behaviors than out-group
judgments, thereby producing the OHE (for reviews, see Hamilton & Sherman,
1994; Mackie et al., 1993; Park et al., 1991).
Although our research was not explicitly designed to test different models of
the OHE (we asked for central tendency, not variability judgments during the
describe task), our results appear to be inconsistent with this reasoning. The
results of Experiment 1 demonstrated that out-group, but not in-group judgments
involved the activation of particular group behaviors from memory. Nevertheless,
the out-group was perceived to be more homogeneous than the in-group on
subsequently collected measures (see Footnote 2). This suggests that the activa-
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greater perceived variability. Moreover, our results demonstrated that in-group
and out-group judgments may each be more exemplar-based than the other,
depending on the valence of the group characteristics to be judged. Our research
beneﬁtted from the use of a priming procedure that allowed for direct measure-
ment of the extent of behavioral activation during the judgment process. In
contrast, previous work on the OHE has relied primarily on correlational evidence
(e.g., Judd & Park, 1988; Mackie et al., 1993; Park & Judd, 1990) and computer
simulations (e.g., Linville et al., 1989). Still, the possibility remains that our
results would have been different had we requested variability instead of central
tendency judgments from our participants.At the least, our results suggest that the
relationship between behavioral activation during judgments and perceived
variability is more complicated than has been previously acknowledged, and
raises some important questions for future research.
Conclusion
People’s expectancies that their in-groups are superior to out-groups tend to be
self-perpetuating. This is due in part to the way that perceivers deal with evidence
that is inconsistent with this belief. Such inconsistencies are often isolated,
situationalized, or simply explained away (e.g., Hamilton et al., 1992; Hewstone
& Jaspers, 1984; Maass & Arcuri, 1992; Maass et al., 1989; Maass et al., 1995;
Pettigrew, 1979).As a result, the impact of such information is minimized. In our
research, we have identiﬁed an additional means through which beliefs in
in-group superiority may be maintained in the face of disconﬁrming evidence. By
differentially relying on memories for speciﬁc expectancy-consistent and -incon-
sistent events, perceivers may inﬂuence the extent to which in-group and
out-group impressions are likely to be altered by new evidence. In particular,
unexpected (and unwanted) impressions of out-group superiority are marginal-
ized through these processes. Although many different forms of intergroup bias
have been observed, to our knowledge this is the ﬁrst demonstration of basic
differences in the cognitive processes that take place as perceivers are formulating
judgments about in-groups and out-groups. Our data demonstrate that perceivers
gather different informational data to support their intergroup judgments, depend-
ing on the implications of the to-be-made judgments. It seems highly unlikely that
perceivers’ have any conscious intention to reinforce their beliefs through these
processes. Rather, these biases appear to be quite implicit in nature. Though
discouraging, such subtle effects are an impressive demonstration of the convic-
tion with which perceivers cling to their beliefs of in-group superiority.
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